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ABSTRACT 
 
Design of a Low Power Cargo Security Device Using a Micropower Ultra-Wideband 
Impulse Radar 
 
Brian Matthew Wihl 
 
 Each year, thousands of cargo containers are broken into during shipping, costing 
billions of dollars in lost and damaged goods. In addition to removing its contents, 
intruders can also add unwanted and dangerous materials to a container, posing a threat to 
National Security. The possibilities of cargo container break-ins require that the 
containers go through check points at which they are physically searched. These searches 
often require the opening of the container, unloading and inspecting all cargo, and then 
loading the container and resealing it. This is a long and costly process.  
 Because of the high costs of break-ins and inspections, many security devices 
have been developed to ensure the safety and detect the tampering of cargo containers. 
Most of these mechanisms involve more intricate door locks and electronic seals that are 
able to add a degree of security to the containers. Other “smart” cargo security devices 
exist, which employ a variety of sensors to detect intrusion, however, none of the current 
solutions are reliable and practical enough to eliminate the necessity for frequent 
inspection of cargo containers. The shipping industry is in need of a reliable, unobtrusive, 
low-cost, low-effort cargo security device.  
 Over the last two decades, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has 
been developing a micropower impulse radar capable of detecting objects and motion 
within a short to medium range. Due to its past uses for intrusion and motion detection, 
the LLNL micropower impulse radar is a top prospect for a sensor technology used in a 
cargo security device.  
 This paper describes the design of a low-power, low-cost cargo security device 
which uses the LLNL micropower impulse radar for the detection of shipping container 
intrusions. With the evaluation of the impulse radar as well as various other sensors, a 
device was created which successfully detected intrusions over 98% of the time with the 
capability of lasting 5 to 6 months when powered by two AA batteries. 
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1. Introduction 
 Transportation of cargo by sea is the most popular shipping method used 
throughout the world, accounting for approximately 90% of the world’s international 
trade [8]. This translates to 200 million cargo container shipments per year, with over 10 
million of these containers being shipped to the United States [9]. During a shipment, the 
container is moved between ships, trains, and trucks, passing through many different 
handlers and shipping organizations. Cargo containers themselves are simple, unsecure 
devices; they are made of relatively thin corrugated steel that can be easily cut and have 
doors that can be unhinged and removed.  
 Each year, thousands of cargo containers are broken into during shipping, costing 
billions of dollars in lost and damaged goods. In addition to removing its contents, 
intruders can also add unwanted and dangerous materials to a container, posing a threat to 
National Security. The possibilities of cargo container break-ins require that the 
containers go through check points at which they are physically searched. These searches 
often require the opening of the container, unloading and inspecting all cargo, and then 
loading the container and resealing it. The searches are done purely through manual 
labor, making the process extremely costly and impractical [9].  
 Because of the high costs of break-ins and inspections, many security devices 
have been developed to ensure the safety and detect the tampering of cargo containers. 
Many of the mechanisms involve more intricate door locks and electronic seals and are 
able to add a degree of security to the containers. None of the present solutions, however, 
are reliable and practical enough to eliminate the necessity for frequent inspection of 
cargo containers. While the door is a major weak point in the security of a container and 
2 
 
the addition of a tamper detecting seal and special lock may help protect it, many 
intrusions involve the removal of the door entirely or the cutting away of a wall. Most 
available security devices fail to detect such break-ins. Some “smart” cargo security 
devices exist, employing a variety of sensors to detect intrusion, however, many of these 
systems use technology that is unreliable in detection of intrusions or are impractical due 
to power consumption, complexity, and/or size. The shipping industry is in need of a 
reliable, unobtrusive, low-cost, low-effort cargo security device (CSD).  
 Over the last two decades, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has 
been developing an ultra low-power impulse radar capable of detecting objects and 
motion within a short to medium range. The radar has been used in many different 
applications and is a proven reliable technology. Due to its past uses for intrusion and 
motion detection, the LLNL micropower impulse radar is a top prospect for a sensor 
technology used in a cargo security device. This paper discusses a CSD developed under 
the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory for a sponsor consisting of various government agencies concerned with the 
secure shipment of cargo in, out, and within the U.S. Because of the sensitivity of the 
project to national security, some of the details have been omitted.  
1.1. System Problem Statement 
 The overall goal of the cargo security sensor stated by the sponsor is to monitor 
and report the tamper state of a cargo container reliably and with minimal impact on 
commerce. This goal is to be reached by the automated and inexpensive detection and 
reporting of the change in the tamper state of a cargo container that is initially known to 
be secure, using a cargo security device (CSD) consisting of a battery powered impulse 
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radar that monitors the cargo container volume, logs intrusions, and reports to a remote 
reader. The critical requirements of the sensor are that it enables rapid and inexpensive 
approval for border crossings and has high reliability, specifically greater than 95% 
probability of detection per door event and less than 4% probability of combined false 
alarm and critical failure per trip, including not alarming due to container motion or door 
racking. Important requirements of the CSD are that it has a compact form factor, does 
not affect the loading, unloading, or sealing of the container, withstands environmental 
hazards (temp, humidity, vibration, shock, ice, fungus, radio communications, lighting, 
static discharge, etc.), is able to send the tamper status of the container automatically to a 
portable reader through easy to use software application, is easily maintainable, can be 
remotely monitored within a range of 3 meters, and is economically viable for private 
sector stakeholders. Other desirable goals of the CSD are that its cost is minimized, is 
battery powered with sufficient battery life, and improves border security.  
1.2. Overview 
 This paper describes the use of the LLNL micropower for the detection of 
shipping container intrusions as well as the design of a low-power, low-cost cargo 
security device. The project was to design a mother card consisting of support hardware 
for the radar which could be mated with the existing LLNL radar daughter card to meet 
the afore mentioned requirements. In Section 2, currently available systems and 
technologies for cargo security will be discussed. A more in depth description of the 
LLNL micropower impulse radar and how it operates is presented in Section 3. The 
design of the CSD including the selection of parts, technologies, and the firmware is 
covered in Section 4. Section 5 describes the intrusion detection algorithm which utilizes 
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the various sensors in order to accomplish the sponsor’s desired detection and error rates. 
Finally, Section 6 provides the results of the project by reporting the power consumption 
of the device and its intrusion detection abilities through the results of many different test 
cases.  
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2. Existing Technologies 
 The most common currently available cargo security devices are tamper-evident 
seals. These seals are placed on the container door’s latch and must be removed in order 
to open the door. Once the seals are locked, they must be destroyed in an unfixable way 
in order to undo the seal and open the door. Therefore a broken seal indicates the opening 
of the container’s door and can be used to know if the door has been opened before it 
should have. Most tamper seals have visible and non visible signs that the seal has been 
broken. While these devices are capable of exposing an unwanted breach through the 
opening of a container’s door, it is not able to detect any other type of intrusion. The 
intruder could cut into the container without breaking the seal, and if the evidence of 
cutting the container goes unnoticed then the intrusion will not be detected. Furthermore, 
these seals are only capable of exposing an intrusion that has already happened. They are 
not able to notify the shippers as the break-in is occurring and in most cases cannot tell 
the inspectors when the intrusion occurred.  
 In more recent years, a select number of “smart” cargo security systems have 
come to the market, employing several different sensors to detect intrusions. The goal of 
these systems is to provide better and more complete detection of intrusions not only 
involving the container door, but also the walls, roof, and floor. Many of the smart 
devices can use wireless communication to notify shippers when an intrusion is occurring 
as well as allow inspectors to check intrusion data without opening the container. The 
sensors used across different security devices include passive infrared detectors, 
ultrasonic sensors, microwave based sensors, and tomographic motion detectors.  
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2.1. Passive Infrared  
 Passive infrared detectors sense a change in heat radiated by object in an 
environment. The sensor settles to the environment and detects changes in heat which are 
usually caused by the introduction of a person’s, or animals, body. Although this 
technology has been used in motion detectors for years and is fairly reliable, it requires 
that there is an unobstructed view of the area that needs to be guarded. Shipping 
containers are typically full of cargo, blocking the sight of a passive infrared sensor and 
therefore making it ineffective.  The sensor by itself has a narrow field of view, therefore 
fresnel lenses or segmented parabolic mirrors are used to focus infrared energy in 
different directions. Figure 1 shows a typical detection pattern that is the result of the 
lens/mirror; note the gaps in the pattern. These gaps are areas that the PIR sensor is 
unable to detect motion in because of the way in which the lens focuses the IR energy. As 
the distance from the sensor increases, the gaps become wider, and the PIR is more likely 
to fail to detect motion. Passive infrared sensors are also sensitive to heat and lighting 
changes in the environment. While lighting changes may not be an issue inside cargo 
containers, relatively swift changes in environmental temperature can be. PIR sensors are 
low power devices and therefore able to be used in a battery powered system.  
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Figure 1: PIR sensors detection pattern [10]. 
 
2.2. Ultrasonic 
 Ultrasonic sensors measure the distance to an object by emitting acoustic waves at 
high frequencies and measuring the wave that returns to the sensor after being reflected 
of the object. If the object is in motion, then the frequency of the return wave will be 
different than that of the emitted wave, known as the Doppler shift. The operation of an 
ultrasonic device is depicted in Figure 2. These sensors have the benefits of being low 
cost and dependable, making the overall system inexpensive and reliable [4]. Although 
ultrasonic sensors do not have coverage gaps, the sensors are prone to the same issues as 
PIR devices, requiring line of sight to detect objects as well as being affected by noise in 
the environment. Furthermore, ultrasonic sensors have a narrow detection area, often 
making it necessary to have multiple sensors at different locations and viewing angles. 
However, operating multiple ultrasonic sensors near each other introduces the issue of 
interference between the sensors [6]. Research of the use of ultrasonic sensors for 
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occupancy detection done by Kianpisheh, Mustaffa, Limtrairut and Keikhosrokianiand 
discusses the negative effects of temperature changes on the reliability of the sensors 
measurement; changes in temperature can cause the sensor to falsely detect objects [5].  
 
 
Figure 2: Ultrasonic sensor operation. 
2.3. Microwave 
 Microwave sensors are similar to ultrasonic; the sensor emits microwaves and 
listens for a return wave, looking for a Doppler shift in the return frequency due to object 
motion. Figure 3 illustrates the operation of a microwave sensor, showing a coverage area 
where the emitted beam will reflect off objects and return to the sensor. Using 
electromagnetic waves in the microwave frequencies has the benefit of being able to 
penetrate many materials that are not conductive, no longer requiring line of sight to 
detect object, and being less susceptible to noise from the environment. Microwave 
sensors are, however, susceptible to interference from other electronic devices operating 
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at or near the same frequency [7].  Like ultrasonic sensors, microwave sensors have a 
narrow field of view and are typically used for detecting motion in long, thin regions 
[10]. Historically, microwave sensors tend to consume a large amount of power, which 
isn’t ideal for a battery powered device.  
 
 
Figure 3: Microwave sensor [10]. 
2.4. Tomographic Sensor Networks 
 Tomographic motion detecting systems use a mesh network of radio transceivers, 
as seen in Figure 4, which detect the changes in the radio waves between each 
transceiver. Like microwave sensors, tomographic motion detectors have the ability to 
“see” through many different types of material and cover a wide area even with obstacles. 
Also like microwave sensors, this technology has high power consumption. Each node in 
a tomographic sensor network must have a sensor for detecting the motion of nearby 
objects, a processor for acquiring the sensor data and initiating communication, and 
communication hardware to allow for the sharing of sensor data with the rest of the 
network. The communication hardware can either be wired (PCI, USB, RS232, etc.), or 
wireless (Bluetooth, WiFi, ZigBee, etc). Requiring communication lines to be routed to 
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every sensor in the network makes this technology invasive and more difficult to set-up. 
As mentioned by Goh et al. in their research on wireless sensor based tomography 
systems, using batteries to power each wireless sensor node is illogical due to the limited 
lifetime and would require frequent replacing [1]. Ali Elkateeb points out that the use of a 
general processor for acquiring sensor data and handling communication does not align 
with the system’s needs and therefore is inefficient [2]. Instead, he proposes the use of 
soft-core processors designed specifically for the sensor nodes to be implemented on 
FPGAs. While this reduces power consumption, it increases design complexity and cost. 
Gungor and Hancke propose the use of energy harvesting techniques to power the sensor 
nodes, but this concept once again adds complexity to the system and is most likely 
ineffective inside a cargo container’s environment [3]. Overall, tomographic motion 
detecting systems require a large amount of hardware, increasing system power 
consumption. The amount of hardware, in addition to the need for a mesh network to be 
setup in every container, also eliminates this technology as a low-effort solution. 
 
Figure 4: Tomographic sensor network [15].  
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3. LLNL Impulse Radar 
 The CSD’s functionality is built around the ability of LLNL’s micropower 
impulse radars. This technology is what separates this CSD from other options that are 
already available. This study’s main goal is to implement the micropower radar into a 
security device and compare its detection ability to that of current sensor devices 
currently being used. The micropower impulse radar is an ultra wide-band sensor which 
transmits and receives narrow pulses of energy across many frequencies, the width of the 
band being determined by the duration of the pulse. With a wide band of frequencies 
being reflected off objects and received by the radar, detailed information about the 
environment can be obtained. Also, since various materials reflect and absorb different 
frequencies of radiation, sending a broad band of frequencies gives the radar excellent 
signal penetration. This enables the radar to “see” through most non-conductive materials 
and not require line-of-sight to intruding objects, a problem that PIR and ultrasonic 
sensor have. A side effect, which has become one of the greatest features of the 
micropower impulse radars, is that the power consumption of the radar is very low due to 
the short time duration of the transmitted pulses. Typically, ultra-wideband radars emit 
pulses with durations between .2 and 1 nanosecond [12]. These properties of the impulse 
radars are in contrast to traditional radars which transmit energy in a single frequency or 
multiple frequencies over time. This leads to larger pulses and therefore higher power 
consumption and less information about the environment per unit time. In comparison to 
the PIR, ultrasonic, microwave and tomographic network technologies discussed in 
section 2, the impulse radar’s power consumption is significantly lower.  
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 The impulse radar uses the range gating concept for detecting objects at specific 
distances. The range gating method sets an interval that occurs some amount of time after 
a pulse is emitted for which the return signal is captured. Since the distance of the object 
is related to the time the return wave is detected, shifting the time interval, called a range 
gate, makes the radar look for objects at different distances. Figure 5 shows the major 
components of the micropower impulse radar as well as the general operating principle of 
generating and emitting short pulses, receiving the return echoes, and inspecting the 
return at specified times according to the set range gate. The radar is able to open a single 
range gate per pulse, allowing it to greatly reduce the reception of unwanted noisy 
signals. To further improve the performance of the radar in a noisy environment, many 
samples of the return signals are averaged together. Also, the period of the emitted pulses 
is not constant, but is randomly changed by a randomization signal. The random periods 
of the pulses along with any outside noise effectively averages out all noise. The random 
period has the added benefit of forming the emitted radar signal as to appear as random 
noise to other radio devices, making the operation of the radar difficult to detect [13]. In 
addition, many impulse radars can coexist in the same environment since each individual 
radar will have a unique signal to determine when to emit and receive pulses. 
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Figure 5: LLNL micropower impulse radar block diagram [13]. 
 
 By looking at the difference in frequency of the signal at a specific range gate 
over time and applying a threshold to that difference, the radar can act as a motion 
detector, sensing moving objects at the distance set by the range gate. Sweeping the range 
gate, which is accomplished by incrementally increasing the delay of the start time of the 
range gate for each pulse (controlled by the delay block in Figure 5), will make the radar 
sense any motion within a maximum distance. When paired with an omni-directional 
antenna, the radar creates a “sensing bubble” (orange sphere in Figure 5) in which any 
motion within a certain distance triggers an alarm. Because of the wavelengths of the 
signals emitted, the radar can detect objects as small as 15 centimeters located 15 
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centimeters to up to 50 meters away [13]. Range and gain settings allow for the 
sensitivity and the diameter of the sensing bubble to be changed. Figure 6 illustrates how 
moving objects at different distances from the radar affect the return signal with reference 
to time, revealing how the range gating method of thresholding the signal at specific 
times is used to set the detection distance. The radar outputs an analog signal of the pulse 
return as well as a digital alarm signal used for detecting motion if motion is present. It 
also has an I
2
C interface for setting the range and gain values.   
  
 
Figure 6: Operation of LLNL radar as a motion detector. 
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4. Design 
 Based of the requirements for the CSD, a general parts list and initial hardware 
system plan was created consisting of the components shown in Figure 7: a 
microprocessor for analyzing and manipulating sensory data, an LLNL impulse radar for 
primary detection of intrusions, a passive infrared sensor for increasing reliability of 
intrusion detection through redundancy of motion detection, a vibration, shock, and 
movement sensor for monitoring the motion of the container in order to rule out false 
alarms, a flash memory for storing intrusion data as well as any important system 
information, and a wireless communication device for remote communication with the 
CSD by an external reading device. Figure 8 shows the radar components assembled on a 
daughter card measuring approximately 1 inch by 1 inch, making it one of the smallest 
radars. Between its motion detecting capability, low power consumption, low cost 
(approximately $10) and small size, the LLNL micropower impulse radar is a great fit as 
a motion sensor for the CSD. This daughter card is a previous product created by LLNL 
for use in other projects. The daughter card connects to the motherboard, which contains 
the all the other hardware described above and shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: System block diagram for CSD. 
 
4.1. Selection of Parts 
 The initial hardware plan covered the critical needs as well as a few of the 
important goals of the CSD. Guided by the remaining important and desired requirements 
of the CSD, more specific parts were selected: the Atmel ATxmega34A4U for the 
microprocessor, the Panasonic EKMB1303112K for the passive infrared sensor, the 
Freescale MMA8452Q accelerometer for a vibration/shock sensor, the Atmel 
AT45DB161E for the flash memory, the Honeywell HIH-6131 for a 
temperature/humidity sensor, and the Nordic nRF8001 Bluetooth LE for wireless 
communications. The guiding forces behind the selection of mentioned components, 
beside that they were able to meet the critical and important goals, were that they be ultra 
low-power, low-cost, small in physical size, and readily available. Due to the typical use 
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case of the CSD, the sleep mode power properties of the components were considered, as 
opposed to the active or standby power modes, since the device will be spending most of 
the time in an idle state waiting for an alarm or to communicate with a reading device.  
 
 
Figure 8: Assembled micropower impulse radar. 
 
 
4.2. Passive Infrared Sensor 
 A passive infrared (PIR) sensor will be included in the CSD design for 
redundancy of motion detection as well as in aiding in ruling out false alarms that the 
LLNL radar is prone to. Although most PIR sensors are relatively identical in all areas, 
the new Panasonic EKMB line of sensor not only offer long distance detection, but also 
are the lowest power devices on the market. The PIR’s proprietary internal circuit allows 
the sensor to go into a sleep mode until motion is detected. In this sleep mode, the sensor 
has a current draw as low as 1 uA. The EKMB line was designed specifically for 
occupancy detecting systems that are designed to be powered by photovoltaic cells or 
small battery cells. Due to the length of the shipping containers, the CSD requires the 
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longer distance sensor, specifically the EKMB1303112K, with a range of 12 meters. This 
particular sensor has the same sleep current of 1 uA, but a standby current between 6-12 
uA. The sensor has a digital output that takes approximately five seconds to settle after 
detecting motion.  
4.2.1. Vibration, Shock, and Movement Sensor 
 In order to rule out false alarms due to the movement of the container, the CSD 
must have a means of detecting when the container is in motion. The Freescale 
MMA8452Q is a low-power digital 3-axis accelerometer. In its typical mode where the 
sensor is sampling the acceleration in each of the three axes, the sensor draws a 
maximum of 165 uA at its highest sampling rate. The feature that makes this particular 
accelerometer ideal is its ability to generate interrupts when certain types of motion 
occur. The MMA8452Q has embedded DSP functions in order to detect freefall/motion, 
transient (shock/vibration), orientation, shake, and single/double tap. Two of the five 
detectable types of motion can be configured to generate interrupts on two of the sensors 
pins. Control registers for each type of motion can be modified to change the sensors 
sensitivity, for example, a transient threshold register controls how violent of a shock 
causes an interrupt to trigger. By configuring the motion and transient detection functions 
to generate interrupts, the CSD will be able to detect when the container is in motion 
and/or is vibrating. To further reduce the power consumption of the accelerometer, it can 
be put into an auto-wake/sleep mode in which it lowers the sampling rate until a motion 
event is detected. This mode fits the CSD’s use case since it will be in a low power mode 
until an event occurs, at which point it will wake and gather information from all its 
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sensors. The sensor communicates using I
2
C, allowing it to share the serial bus with other 
sensors in the system. 
4.2.2. Processor 
 There are many microprocessors that support the features needed to meet the 
requirements of the CSD. However, due its flexibility, low-power options in various 
sleep and power-down states, and low-cost, the Atmel ATxmega34A4U microprocessor 
was selected. This Atmel processor can be operated at a voltage as low as 1.6 V and can 
be put in a deep power-down mode in which the processor will only draw 1 uA. In its 
deep power-down mode, the processor disables its system clock and will only be woken 
up by external interrupts or an interrupt from its watchdog timer. Since the system clock 
is disabled in the deep power-down mode, it is important that the processor supports 
many asynchronous interrupts, allowing the processor to enter and stay in the power-
down mode for most of the time, and only be awoken when a sensor or external 
component requires data to be serviced.  
 The processor also includes a real-time clock module, which reduced the need for 
a separate component to keep track of the time that will be used for time stamping data 
(mainly alarms) in memory. The removal of an extra component for the system reduces 
overall cost, power consumption, and size. Since the system clock is disabled in the deep 
power-down mode, an external 32.768 kHz crystal is needed to keep time during the idle 
state. This does not, however, add hardware to the design since a 32.768 kHz rail-to rail 
oscillator is needed for the nRF8001 Bluetooth chip. The ATxmega34A4U allows for the 
digital output of the external clock on one of its GPIO pins, allowing the processor and 
the Bluetooth chip to “share” the oscillator by attaching the crystal to the ATxmega and 
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then connecting the nRF8001’s clock input to the GPIO of the ATxmega with the digital 
clock output.  
 Encryption of the data saved on and transmitted from the CSD may be required to 
ensure security; the ATxmega34A4U contains an AES/DES encryption/decryption 
hardware module. Using hardware to encrypt/decrypt data eliminates the need for the 
implementation of a costly (in processing time and therefore power) 
encryption/decryption algorithm in software.  
 The flexibility of the processor is seen through its many general purpose I/Os, 
support for common communication protocols, and diverse clocking options. This 
flexibility allows for an open design which supports future changes, modifications, and 
additions to the system without having to change the processor and consequently the 
firmware.  
4.2.3. Memory 
 The important features to use for selecting the flash memory were size and power 
consumption. The Atmel AT45DB161E is a 16Mbit flash memory, having more than 
enough memory space to store alarm logs, system information (such values for 
identification and communication), and allowing future features that may require the use 
of non-volatile memory. More importantly, however, is that this flash memory can 
operate at 2.3 V, one of the lowest voltage flash chips available, and draws only 3uA 
while in sleep mode. Due to the typically higher operating voltages of flash memories, 
this component was the deciding factor in the voltage level at which the system would 
require. The system could now operate at 2.5 V (the impulse radar’s operating voltage), 
however a system voltage of 2.7 V was used (regulated from the voltage of two AA 
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batteries in parallel, so approximately 3 V). This memory communicates using SPI, 
which is a highly supported serial protocol and allows for multiple slaves to be connected 
to the same wire bus (as long as each slave has its own select signal). Other components 
in the design also use SPI, allowing for these components to share lines, reducing system 
complexity and allowing for flexibility.   
4.2.4. Temperature/Humidity 
 A sensor to measure and record the temperature and humidity of the interior of the 
cargo container was added to meet the CSD’s desired requirement of sensing the 
environment of the container. Implementing this sensor into the design also proves that 
environmental sensors using common communication protocols can be easily added to 
the CSD in the future, allowing for a flexible system which can be modified to meet the 
user’s specific needs. The temperature and humidity sensor selected was the Honeywell 
HIH-6131 due to its low operating voltage and sleep-mode current; 2.3 V and .6 uA 
respectively. Most humidity sensors have a long settling time, some taking several days, 
after extreme conditions, such as those during soldering or extremely moist 
environments, during which the readings are highly inaccurate; the Honeywell sensor has 
a settling time of only 5 hours. The HIH-6131 uses I
2
C for communication, allowing 
other components in the system which use I
2
C to share a bus. The sensor is also available 
in an ultra small form factor, is low-cost, and is industry leading in accuracy.   
4.3. Bluetooth  
 Bluetooth was selected as the wireless technology for communication between the 
CSD and an external reader. The motivation for choosing Bluetooth was that it is a well 
supported by mobile devices including laptops, tablets, and phones, making the later 
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development of a CSD reading device flexible. Bluetooth also supports the range of 
operation desired for the CSD and reader and is one of the lower power wireless 
standards. A concern for the CSD was that due to the fact that it would be housed inside a 
metal container, wireless communication to devices outside of the container would not be 
effective, however, initial tests of Bluetooth devices operating across the container walls 
proved that it was able to consistently communicate within 5 meters of the container, 
especially when the power was set to 0dBm.  
 Although Bluetooth is one of the lowest power options for wireless 
communication, there were still concerns for its power consumption since the CSD is 
desired to last at least 3 months on a single “charge” (set of batteries) and will not have a 
large battery due to the goal of making the device physically small. In order to reduce 
power consumption of the wireless communications, the Bluetooth hardware could be put 
into a low-power sleep mode until communication is needed. This would require a way of 
waking up the hardware once communication is desired, which is signified by a reader 
device trying to bond with the CSD Bluetooth hardware. A solution for discovering the 
reader would be to have a “sniffing” circuit which would detect power in the Bluetooth 
band. Once the power detected in the band is above a certain threshold, the circuit would 
signal the system to wake up the Bluetooth hardware and bond with the reader. Several 
possible circuits to accomplish this were simulated, however none were consistent in 
noisy environments (which would be the case due to the ultra-wide band impulse radar) 
and the circuits would add unwanted complexity to the CSD.  
 A new solution to the wireless power consumption issue was found in the recent 
development of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), which is part of the Bluetooth 4.0 
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specification. Although BLE was introduced to the core specification in 2010, the first 
device to implement it did not arrive until late 2011 with many more supporting devices 
arriving by early 2012. More importantly, BLE development hardware was not widely 
and readily available until mid 2012. Although as of 2012 BLE was not as supported as 
other wireless protocols, its power saving abilities and high flexibility in connection and 
advertisement settings made it a top prospect. Although it was not heavily supported, 
BLE was incorporated into the core specification and therefore was likely to become well 
supported over time.  
4.3.1. Power Consumption 
 Bluetooth LE achieves its low power consumption by greatly reducing the duty 
cycle of the communication and therefore the amount of time the radio is on compared to 
other Bluetooth specifications. Figure 9 depicts a BLE device’s typical behavior when 
connected to a device; the device is mostly in an idle state, only becoming active 
periodically to transfer data. When a BLE device is advertising, its behavior is very 
similar to when it is connected; only turning on periodically to send an advertisement 
packet. During the advertisement, BLE uses 3 channels with the radio being on for only 
.6 to 1.2ms per total advertisement period. Furthermore, BLE allows for the 
advertisement interval to be set between 20 milliseconds to 10 seconds, enabling a choice 
between lowering power consumption and increasing connection response time. In 
comparison, other Bluetooth specifications typically advertise on 32 channels, requiring 
the radio to be on for 22.5 milliseconds during the total advertisement period. Bluetooth 
does not allow for the setting of the advertisement interval. BLE also enables the 
connection interval to be set between 1.25 milliseconds to 4 seconds when a connection 
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is established with a peer device. This allows for the reduction of power consumption 
during the connected state in sacrifice of data rate and is meant for use cases when a 
device will be connected for long periods of time. Since BLE devices will spend the vast 
majority of their time in a sleep mode, the sleep current will become the main factor in 
overall power consumption. As the advertisement and connection intervals are 
lengthened and practically become infinitely large when compared to the radio’s active 
time, the peak power consumption (during transmit and receive) no longer increase the 
devices average power consumption.  
 
 
Figure 9: Current profile of BLE device in connection state [14]. 
 
 Due to the flexibility of the advertisement interval and the effect that increasing 
the interval has on reducing the power consumption, in addition to BLE device’s already 
low consumption, the BLE device can be left on and constantly advertising without 
significantly reducing the battery life of the CSD. This would allow an external reading 
device the ability to discover and connect to the CSD at any time. Since a connection 
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delay time of 10 seconds is allowable, the advertisement interval can be set to its 
maximum possible time and the power consumption will be minimized. The connection 
interval can be set at its lowest setting, allowing for the fastest data rate and will not 
significantly increase the CSD’s overall power consumption since it will spend most of 
its time in the advertising state waiting for an external reader to try to connect.  
 Because of the periodic nature of the advertisement and connection states, BLE 
can have a longer connection setup time and a lower data rate. With the advertisement 
interval set to its largest value, it is possible that a connection will not be established for 
up 10 seconds while the discovering device waits for the next advertisement packet. Due 
to the small packet sizes and lower packet frequency because of connectional intervals, 
application throughput using BLE is around 270 kbps. The original purpose for BLE was 
to allow devices that will be transferring small amounts of data (around 20 bytes) at a low 
frequency.  
 Specifically, the Nordic nRF8001 was selected for the BLE hardware. The 
nRF8001 includes the radio, link layer and host stack all in one integrated chip. The chip 
is low cost, low power (includes DC/DC converter to increase efficiency by 20%), and is 
physically small (5 millimeters by 5 millimeters). The nRF8001 is a slave device and 
uses a serial interface, named the Application Controller Interface by Nordic, which is 
almost identical to SPI except for an added control line that the slave device uses to 
indicate when it has data to send to the master controller. The typical use of the nRF8001 
can be seen in Figure 10, where the MOSI, MISO, and SCK lines are analogous to those 
in SPI and REQN is the same as the SS line. The RDYN is an added line that indicates 
data is ready for transfer to the application controller. The nRF8001 offers a wide range 
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of advertisement and connection interval settings, allowing fine tuning of its power 
consumption versus responsiveness.  
 
Figure 10: Connection between application controller and nRF8001 [14]. 
 
 During the advertisement interval the nRF8001 broadcasts its identity to any 
listening devices that are trying to connect in advertisement packets containing, among 
other information, the specific nRF8001’s MAC address, device name, and connection 
settings. The advertisement interval determines the amount of time between each 
transmission of an advertisement packet. When a device attempts to connect to the 
nRF8001, it will send a connect packet that contains the desired connection interval, 
which sets the period between transmissions of data packets. The graphs in Figure 11 
show the relationship between the advertisement and connection interval length and the 
nRF8001’s current consumption, revealing diminishing returns on power savings once 
the intervals are set approximately above half a second. As seen on the plots, the average 
current draw for an advertisement interval of about .5 seconds is roughly 30 uA, further 
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supporting the idea of leaving the nRF8001 on and advertising during the system’s idle 
state without harsh effects on the CSD’s power consumption.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Current consumption of nRF8001 versus connection and advertisement interval 
settings [14]. 
28 
 
4.3.2. Communicating with BLE and the nRF8001 
 Communication using BLE is based on the GATT (Generic Attribute) protocol. In 
the GATT protocol, devices take on one of two roles: client and server. The client is the 
device that will be requesting and receiving data from the server while the server handles 
the client’s requests and responds with the desired data. Data is transferred between the 
server and client by setting and reading characteristic values. Characteristics are created 
to represent the data that will be transferred and are stored on the GATT server. For 
example if a heart rate sensor will be sending beats per minute, a characteristic will be 
created that stores the heart rate in a single byte on the GATT server. The client will 
request an update on the heart rate and the sensor will set the characteristic value. 
Multiple characteristics can be grouped together to create a service. Each characteristic 
can have a descriptor which describes the use and context of the characteristic. To 
communicate, the client requests the server to update the characteristic value and, once 
the server has done so, then reads the characteristic value from the server. A service was 
created for the CSD that allowed the client (a reader device) to send requests in the form 
of a single byte integer which the server (the CSD) would receive and respond to 
accordingly. 
 The application controller is concerned with the GATT layer of the BLE stack, 
which is seen on the top of the BLE stack in Figure 12. The layers seen in Figure 12 show 
that the BLE stack is vastly different from those of other Bluetooth standards. For this 
reason, a BLE device is not compatible with devices using other versions of Bluetooth 
unless it is a dual-mode chip, meaning it also contains the Bluetooth stack necessary for 
communicating with other versions. For the nRF8001, the ACI allows the application 
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controller to communicate with the GATT layer; however this is done in an indirect way 
using what Nordic has coined as service pipes. Instead of setting the values of GATT 
characteristics, the application controller writes to service pipes which are assigned to 
specific characteristics, like the pipes shown in Figure 18. In order to read and write to 
the characteristics, a pipe must be opened for each desired operation on each 
characteristic value. For example, Figure 13 represents a GATT service which is defined 
by two characteristics. The first characteristic will be read from in two different ways: a 
read that acknowledges the reception of the data, and a read that does not send an 
acknowledgment. Since these are two different operations, two separate pipes will be 
opened. The second characteristic only supports being written to and therefore only 
requires a single pipe.  
 
 
Figure 12: BLE stack [14]. 
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Figure 13: Illustration of service pipes used by the nRF8001 [14]. 
  
 Before the nRF8001 can be used for communication, it must go through a setup 
process. Setup messages are created using Nordic’s nRFGo Studio, an application which 
is used to configure all the wireless radios which Nordic sells. It is in nRFGo Studio that 
new characteristics are created and service pipes are set for communication. Device 
attributes are also set using the application, such as the setting of the device name, 
advertisement interval and connection interval. nRFGo outputs a text file containing the 
byte values that will form the setup messages for the nRF8001. Each message created by 
the application contains a setting for configuring the radio and supporting hardware. The 
messages also contain the information needed to create the characteristics and services 
used for communication between the client and server, as well as the service pipes that 
will be associated with the characteristics. The messages are sent one-by-one from the 
application controller to the nRF8001 as shown in Figure 14, with the reception of each 
setup message acknowledged by a CommandResponseEvent from the BLE device, 
indicating that it is ready for the next message (the responses from the device in Figure 
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14). Once all the setup messages have been received, the nRF8001 issues a response 
indicating that the transaction is complete and then sends a DeviceStartedEvent.  
 
 
Figure 14: nRF8001 setup process [14]. 
 
 After the nRF8001 has completed its setup sequence, it is controlled by sending 
system and data commands and responds with system and data events. Commands and 
events are represented as data packets containing a header for identification, payload, and 
a checksum. The main events used are the: 
 DeviceStartedEvent 
 CommandResponseEvent 
 ConnectedEvent 
 PipeStatusEvent 
 DataCreditEvent  
 DataReceivedEvent 
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 PipeErrorEvent 
 DisconnectedEvent 
 
The DeviceStartedEvent tells the application controller whether the nRF8001 has 
successfully powered on, what operation mode it is in, the available space in the data 
buffers, or an error code describing the failure that occurred during startup. The 
CommandResponseEvent is the reply from the nRF8001 after the application controller 
has issued a command. This packet contains confirmation or error codes depending on 
the outcome of the command. A ConnectedEvent tells the application controller that a 
peer device has connected, the information of the peer device (such as MAC address and 
clock accuracy), and the connection settings (connection interval, latency, and timeout). 
After a connection is setup, a PipeStatusEvent occurs which describes which pipes are 
open for transferring data on as well as the direction (read/write) of the open pipes. After 
data is successfully sent through a pipe, a DataCreditEvent will be issued, indicating that 
more room is open on the data buffers. When data is received by the BLE device and is 
ready for transfer to the application processor, a DataReceivedEvent will be issued 
containing the data and the pipe it was received on. If the data is unsuccessfully sent, then 
a PipeErrorEvent will occur, containing error codes indicating the type of failure. When 
the connection is ended for whatever reason, a DisconnectedEvent will be sent to the 
application controller describing the reason for the disconnection. The application 
processor typically uses the Connect and SendData commands to control the nRF8001. 
The Connect command tells the Nordic chip to go into its advertising state with a set 
timeout and advertisement interval. The SendData command is used to transfer data on a 
specific pipe, and therefore set the corresponding characteristic value. A typical scenario 
between the application controller and the nRF8001 can be seen in Figure 15 where the 
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nRF8001 issues a DeviceStartedEvent and the application processor establishes a 
connection then begins transferring data. Because the nRF8001 operates by sending 
asynchronous events to the application processor, the best way to handle communication 
is by creating an interrupt subroutine which will be called when the nRF8001 has an 
event ready. The processor will receive the event, determine the correct response, then 
sends a command accordingly.    
 
 
Figure 15: Typical communication between application controller and nRF8001 [14]. 
 
 The nRF8001 allows for a maximum of 20 bytes of data to be sent in each packet. 
While 20 bytes is well suited for the transfer of remote sensing data (the original purpose 
for BLE), it is not ideal for transferring large amounts of data in a small period of time, as 
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is the case for the CSD’s communication with a reading device. In order to send the 
intrusion log and system information that is stored in the flash memory, the data must be 
split up into 20 byte blocks and sent packet-by-packet. With a minimum connection 
interval 1.25 ms (meaning a packet will be sent every 1.25 ms) the maximum data rate of 
log data is 128 kbps (this is lower than the 270 kbps quoted by Nordic since only 20 bytes 
out of a packets 41 bytes consist of application data). Although this is a low data rate 
compared to many other wireless technologies, it is perfectly fine for the CSD since it 
will only be transferring a small amount of data at a time (a log entry consists of 16 bytes, 
meaning that the CSD can transfer 1000 intrusion logs per second).  
4.4. Event Driven Firmware 
 To reduce the amount of power consumption for the CSD, each component must 
be operating in a sleep mode whenever possible. Every component except for the 
nRF8001 and micropower impulse radar can be put in a power down mode while it is not 
sensing. The accelerometer will sleep until either a strong enough shock or movement is 
detected, the temperature and humidity sensor will be sleeping until a reading is made 
and logged in memory, the memory will be in low power mode until there is data to store, 
the PIR sensor will sleep until motion is detected, and the processor will basically be off 
until one of the sensors is triggered or a devices tries to connect to the nRF8001. The 
radar is always on since it does not have a sleep mode and consumes very little power as 
does the nRF8001during its advertisement state. 
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Figure 16: Interrupt routines for sensors and communication. 
 
 The firmware is designed to maximize power saving by placing all devices in 
their low power modes and configuring interrupts and interrupt service routines to handle 
sensor information when it is ready. As seen in Figure 16, all the external sensors as well 
as the nRF8001 and real time clock module generate interrupts which wake the processor 
from its deep sleep state. On startup, the firmware first configures all its IO including 
serial buses, enables the interrupts for the accelerometer, real time clock, Bluetooth, 
radar, and PIR sensor, enables the processors low power sleep mode, and configures the 
accelerometer to generate interrupts on shock and movement. The ATxmega’s external 
interrupts that were chosen for the sensors are all asynchronous, meaning that they do not 
depend on the clock of the processor so that when the system clock is disabled in the low 
power mode, the processor will still wake up and service the interrupts. The firmware 
then reads the system settings and memory status from the flash memory. System settings 
include values for device identification, Bluetooth radio settings, and the frequency to 
make temperature and humidity readings. The memory status informs the processor of 
the amount of memory that is currently being used through the number of intrusion 
entries. After the system settings and memory status are loaded, the firmware configures 
the Bluetooth radio. The setup messages for the nRF8001 that are generated by the 
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nRFGo Studio are read from memory and then sent to the Bluetooth device. After the last 
message has been sent, the firmware waits for a DeviceStartedEvent from the nRF8001 
indicating a successful startup. If the DeviceStartedEvent holds an error message, then 
the setup is retried until success or after a set number of tries. If the setup is not 
completed successfully after the set number of tries, then the firmware discontinues the 
startup sequence and enters an error state denoted by a red flashing LED. Once the 
nRF8001has started up successfully, the firmware issues a Connect command to the 
nRF8001, placing it in its advertisement state so that an outside reader device may 
connect. Once the nRF8001 is advertising, the processor is placed in its low power mode, 
waiting for an interrupt to wake it up.  
 The intrusion detection algorithm is implemented in the interrupt subroutines for 
the PIR sensor, radar, and accelerometer. Each interrupt routine time stamps when the 
event occurred and then checks for other events that have happened within the time 
windows mentioned in the description of the intrusion algorithm. The accelerometer 
interrupt routine will also add an entry to the log in flash memory of it senses a shock 
greater than its set threshold, allowing the cargo owner to know if the container was 
subject to any harsh movements. If any intrusions are detected as a result of the 
algorithm, then an alarm instance is created in the processors local memory and stamped 
with the time when the intrusion was detected. Since more events can occur while the 
time window is open for the intrusion, it is not immediately written to memory until the 
time window closes. This enables more data to be collected in order to present better and 
more accurate information about the intrusion. The RTC interrupt routine keeps track of 
system time and is responsible for carrying out any constant time operations such as 
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reading the temperature and humidity sensor and the battery voltage level, then writing 
the values to the log in flash memory. The RTC routine also keeps track of the time 
windows used for the intrusion detection algorithm. When the time window closes, the 
current alarm entry held in the processor’s local memory has the alarm duration added to 
it and is written to flash memory and added to the log.  
 The Bluetooth interrupt routine handles any events that are issued from the 
nRF8001. The routine first reads in the event packet’s data and then decodes which type 
of event it is. The routine handles three events: ConnectedEvent, DisconnectedEvent, and 
DataReceivedEvent. If a ConnectedEvent is received, the firmware then waits for the 
passkey to be sent in order to authorize the connecting device for communication. If the 
passkey is entered correctly, then the connecting device is allowed to stay connected and 
transfer data. If the passkey is incorrect, a Disconnect command is sent to the nRF8001 
and the connecting device is denied a connection to the CSD.  
 Once a device is connected, it may send commands to the CSD asking for data or 
changing settings. Data sent from the connected device is seen as DataReceivedEvents to 
the firmware. The data held in the packet is decoded and the command is carried out. The 
connected device may set the CSD’s system time, request the transfer of the intrusion log, 
arm the CSD for detecting intrusions, unarm the CSD, clear the log file, set the radar 
range and gain, request the device status, or change the passkey. To change the system 
time, the global variables used by the RTC interrupt routine are modified to match the 
time sent in the time change packet.  
 When the connected device requests the intrusion log, the handling of sending the 
log is deferred from the interrupt routine since it may take some time to complete, 
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allowing any interrupts, other than those from the nRF8001, to still be handled. When 
transferring the intrusion log, first the total number of entries is sent followed by each 
entry, one at a time, along with a sequence number indicating which entry in the log is 
currently being sent. The sequence number allows for additional error checking during 
the transmission as well as indication of when the transfer is complete.  
 If the connected device issues an arm command, the radar, accelerometer, and 
PIR sensor’s interrupts are enabled and any intrusion detection variables, such as current 
time windows, are zeroed. If the command is to disarm the device, the previously 
mentioned interrupts are disabled and any pending alarms that have not yet been written 
to memory are added to the log. The clear entry command causes the number of saved 
entries variable to be set to zero, meaning that new entries will overwrite the old entries. 
When the connected device requests the CSD’s system status, a data packet is sent which 
holds flags indicating if an intrusion alarm has occurred, the accelerometer has triggered, 
and if the battery is low. These values are used to quickly check the CSD and know if an 
intrusion has occurred. If an intrusion hasn’t occured, then the container can remain 
sealed and won’t require an inspection. If the intrusion alarm flag indicates a break in, 
then the log file can be downloaded and inspected to further aid in deciding whether to 
inspect the container or not.  The system status also includes the current temperature, 
humidity, battery voltage, and system time. The change passkey command replaces the 
current passkey saved in memory with the new passkey sent in the packet. 
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5. Intrusion Detection 
 Intrusions are detected using the micro-impulse radar sensor as well as the passive 
infrared sensor. Each sensor is subject to noise in various environments. In areas which 
contain medium to heavy electromagnetic interference, the micro impulse radar can 
trigger falsely (a false trigger being when the radar alarm is triggered for any reason other 
than the motion of a nearby object). In testing the radar sensor, when put near a wireless 
router with a significant amount of radio traffic the radar could be triggered. Because a 
PIR sensor is detecting the infrared radiation emitted from the environment (triggering 
when a large enough change in the radiated energy occurs) and infrared radiation of 
objects are closely related to the objects’ temperature, environments with temperatures 
that vary over relatively short periods of time, especially when the temperatures are 
around those of a human’s body, can cause the PIR sensor to trigger falsely. An example 
would be a container that has been warmed by the sun being occasionally struck by 
medium to high breezes of cool air. The wind can cause parts of the container to cool 
relatively quickly and therefore cause the PIR sensor to trigger.  
 Since the radar and PIR sensor operate in extremely different areas of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, these devices can be used together to rule out the situations 
which cause false positives for each sensor individually. In addition, with a better 
understanding of how the sensor operates and, more importantly, how the sensor reacts to 
the environments it is in, an effective and accurate algorithm can be developed for 
intrusion detection. Although the radar alarm is sensitive to electromagnetic interference, 
its behavior when triggering due to the interference is quite different than when it triggers 
due to motion of nearby objects. When subject to interference, the radar triggers with a 
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small and regular period, as opposed to the longer irregular period when triggering due to 
the detection of motion. The PIR sensor also reacts differently when triggering due to 
changes in temperature of static environment versus triggering due to a non-static 
environment and in opposite manner to that of the radar.  The PIR sensor will trigger 
regularly with a small period when detecting motion, and less regularly with a larger 
period when detecting the change in temperature of a static environment. To understand 
this difference in triggering behavior, the example of the warming/cooling container 
mentioned earlier can be explored deeper; the warm container is cooled relatively quickly 
by a cool breeze, causing the PIR sensor to trigger falsely. The container then warms up 
slowly due to the sun (since the heating is slow, it does not cause the PIR to trigger 
again). Eventually the container is cooled again and the PIR will trigger, but the process 
takes a long time when compared to the rate of triggering caused by the motion of an 
object. Since the wind is irregular and the warming of the container takes time, the trigger 
interval is irregular. On the other hand, when the PIR is detecting motion (and more 
importantly the motion of a human being), the movement is constant and quick, causing 
the PIR to trigger more frequently and at a more consistent interval.  
 As mentioned earlier, a false positive for each sensor individually is defined as the 
sensor being triggered for any reason other than the motion of a nearby object. However, 
a false positive for the entire cargo security device is anytime an intrusion is detected for 
any other reason than an object entering into the container. Although the two definitions 
may sound nearly identical, there are key differences which are important to explore.  
After the contents of a cargo container are loaded and the doors are shut and sealed, the 
container is then subject to a harsh environment. The container may be loaded onto a 
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truck, ship, and/or train and depending on the loading method may experience swaying 
motions, short violent motions, vibrations, and/or tilting/rotating.  While the container is 
in transit it is also subject to many different types of motion. These movements can cause 
the contents in the container to move around and shift as well as cause the walls and other 
components of the container to vibrate, and, if the movements are large enough, will 
cause the radar and/or PIR to trigger. Since scenarios which can make the container 
engage in the previously mentioned behavior is by no means uncommon during shipping, 
having the means to detect and rule out such scenarios is a requirement for an accurate 
cargo security sensor. To detect the motion of the container, a three axis accelerometer 
was added to the design. The accelerometer can detect when the container is in motion, 
its orientation (such as when it is tipping), as well as when it has experienced abrupt 
shock-type motion (in the event that the container is dropped or struck by another object) 
and rule out alarms that are generated because of the motion.  
 To develop the intrusion detection algorithm, the CSD was placed inside a 
container and reported any sensor events along with the time at which they occurred. 
Different types of interactions with the container were administered, including opening 
and closing the doors, vibrating the container, and shifting the cargo while the CSD was 
in motion. Each administered interaction along with its time was noted and compared to 
the CSD’s log file in order to find a relationship between the type of interaction and the 
way in which the sensors react. An example of the CSD’s log file can be seen in Figure 
17. 
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Figure 17: Log file from CSD. 
 
 The intrusion detection algorithm uses a windowed approach to correlate radar, 
PIR, and accelerometer events in order to decide if a true intrusion has occurred. When 
an event occurs, a window of time is set wherein the device considers subsequent events 
related to the prior events which initially opened the window. Events are instances when 
one of the sensors are triggered, causing an interrupt for the processor to handle. Due to 
the different behavior of the sensors mentioned earlier, each window is specific to its 
corresponding sensor. An example of a time window can be seen in Figure 18: when a 
PIR event occurs, a five second window is opened for detecting a radar event. If a radar 
event occurs within the window, an alarm will be saved. Figure 18 also contains the 
window for two radar events. If an initial radar event occur (meaning that the radar is 
triggered while there is no previously opened window), then a window is opened one 
second after the initial radar event and lasts for five seconds. The delay in opening the 
window reduces the amount of false alarms caused noise.  
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Figure 18: Windowed intrusion algorithm. 
 
 The detection of an intrusion will begin with one of two possible initial events: a 
radar or PIR event.  If an initial radar event occurs, as is shown in Figure 19, the 
algorithm first checks the accelerometer; if the accelerometer has triggered recently due 
to vibration, shock, a considerable amount of motion, or a significant change in 
orientation, then the radar event will be disregarded since it is most likely due to the 
motion of the container. If the accelerometer has not triggered recently, the next window 
to check is the intrusion detection window, or alarm window. Since an intrusion can last 
anywhere from a couple seconds to hours, multiple intrusions would be logged for the 
single actual intrusion if there was not a delay after each logged alarm in which the 
algorithm attributes detected motion to the previous intrusion.  If the alarm window has 
not expired, then the radar event is recorded as the most recent radar occurrence. If the 
alarm window has expired, then a new intrusion may be detected depending on the state 
of the radar window.  Since the radar is subject to noise which typically causes it to 
trigger regularly and frequently (a period of less than one second), the radar's window 
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begins one second after it "initially" triggers (an initial trigger is when the radar event 
occurs after not occurring for six seconds) and lasts for five seconds. If the radar window 
has expired then the radar event is recorded as the "initial" radar event, unless the PIR has 
triggered recently (within the last five seconds). If a PIR event has recently occurred, then 
an intrusion will be logged and the radar, PIR, and alarm windows will be reset. If the 
PIR has not triggered recently, then the radar event will be recorded as the latest 
occurrence that will be used to detect intrusions when subsequent events occur. If the 
radar window has not expired and the radar has not triggered within the last second, then 
an intrusion is logged and the radar and alarm windows are reset. If the radar has 
triggered within the last second, the radar event is saved and marked as the latest 
occurrence which will be used later for determining future intrusions.  
 Since radar and PIR events that occur within a certain time of an accelerometer 
event are disregarded, it is possible that an intrusion can take place but not be detected if 
the container is moving or vibrating during the break-in. However, the CSD logs 
accelerometer events which can be inspected to discover if the container was subject to 
an extensive amount of motion. Accelerometer events occurring periodically for some 
time interval or when the container should not be in motion (identified by comparing the 
accelerometer event’s time to the shipping schedule) are an indication of a possible 
intrusion. Unauthorized accelerations which do not correlate with the shipping schedule 
can be considered an intrusion either due to the possibility that the whole container was 
“stolen” (moved without permission), or the intruders attempted to neutralize the sensor 
by making it attribute any motion detected to the movement of the whole container (for 
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example, one intruder continuously strikes the outside of the container while the other 
intruder breaks-in).  
 The intrusion detection algorithm is similar when a PIR event occurs first, the 
only differences being the window sizes. Since the PIR has a several second settle time 
after it has detected motion, the window for checking for another PIR event does not 
open till several seconds after the first event. Figure 18 includes a truth table that 
summarizes the different series of event which cause an alarm. A ‘yes’ in the table 
signifies that the type of event occurred within the time window. Cases where only one 
type of event occurs only result in an alarm when the type of event happens multiple 
times and within the time window of the initial event.  
 
 
Figure 19: Intrusion detection algorithm beginning with a radar event. 
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6. Results 
 This section discusses the results of the project. From the requirements of the 
sponsor two overall goals are seen: create a CSD that requires little attention and detects 
container intrusions reliably. For the CSD to require little attention, it must be able to 
operate inside a container for long periods of time without needing maintenance. The 
major type of maintenance needed for remote sensors is the replacements or recharging 
of power sources. The first results section discusses the power consumption of the 
designed CSD. The subsequent sections present the test cases developed and the CSD’s 
performance for detecting container intrusions.  
6.1. Power Consumption 
 As a result of the careful selection of low power components as well as the event 
driven design of the firmware, the CSD accomplishes extremely low power consumption, 
especially when being compared to other smart container security sensors. In its typical 
use, the CSD spends most of its time in an idle state within which nearly every 
component is in a low power sleep mode. The processor is nearly completely off with its 
system clock disabled and interrupts enabled to wake it up on the event of an real time 
clock (RTC) tick (happening once per second), an accelerometer, PIR, or radar event, 
when it is time to take a temperature/humidity reading, or a reading device attempts to 
communicate. The accelerometer is in a sleep mode waiting for the container to move or 
vibrate significantly enough to cause an interrupt. The PIR sensor, temperature/humidity 
sensor, and flash memory are in their low power sleep modes. The radar is active but only 
consuming micro amps of current. The only device that is active is the Nordic BLE chip, 
which is in its advertisement state. The nRF8001’s current draw spikes to about 12 mA 
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when it transmits an advertisement packet, but due to its advertisement scheme discussed 
previously its average current consumption is approximately 10 uA. In its idle state with 
the LED blinking at 1 Hz, the CSD’s average current is .4 mA. A typical current 
consumption profile of the CSD in its idle state can be seen in Figure 20, showing the 
system mostly sleeping except when handling an interrupt event and advertising over 
Bluetooth.  
 
Figure 20: Current profile for CSD. 
 
 Figure 21 breaks down the current consumption of the system during its idle state 
by each major component. The accelerometer, radar, and processor account for most of 
power consumption (the ‘other’ category is composed of the smaller system components, 
with its current consumption being dominated by the blinking status LEDs). During 
testing, when the device wakes up from its idle state, the highest current draw observed 
was 9 mA, making the overall average current consumption approximately .5 mA. Due to 
its low power consumption, the CSD can be powered by two AA size batteries and still 
have an estimated life of 5 to 6 months without needing the batteries to be replaced. 
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Being able to be powered by AAs increases the ease of use of the device, removing the 
need to have a specific charger or worry about replacing a rechargeable battery. AA 
batteries are readily available around the world, nearly guaranteeing the ability to power 
the CSD at all times. 
 
 
Figure 21: Current consumption of major system components. 
 
6.2. Intrusion Detection 
 After selecting the impulse radar as a possible sensor for the CSD, tests were 
conducted to inspect its usefulness inside a container. The radar was set inside the 
container powered by a coin cell battery with an LED connected to the digital alarm 
output. The radar was monitored by a stationary viewer watching for the LED to turn on 
when the container was breached. 100 test runs were administered with each run 
consisting of an intruder opening the container door, walking 6 feet into the container, 
and then exiting and closing the door. The test runs were done at various speeds, with the 
shortest occurrence happening in about 10 seconds and the longest for approximately one 
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minute. The LED was expected to light up when the door was opened, while the intruder 
moved in the container, and then go off once the door was closed. The initial results of 
the tests were promising, showing that every entry into the container was detected by the 
radar. Because of the penetrating abilities of the radar, cargo inside the container did not 
affect the detection of motion; people moving on the other side of cargo were still 
detected. Figure 22 shows a test case in which the radar sensor was placed in the back of 
a loaded container and an intruder moved around the entrance. There was approximately 
10 feet of miscellaneous packaging, mainly consisting of paper products, blocking the 
line of sight between the intruder and the radar. The radar was still able to detect any 
significant motion of the intruder including door openings.  
 In addition to the radar’s penetrating ability, the multipath generated from the 
reflection of the emitted signals off the cargo container’s walls allowed the radar to “see 
around” and obstructions which it could not penetrate. This allows a single impulse radar 
to be used to detect motion anywhere within the container, as opposed to needing several 
sensor in different locations as was the case for the sensor types discussed in section 2. 
Figure 23 conveys the concept of multipath and how the emitted signals from a 
transmitter can reach a receiver in multiple ways due to reflections off the container wall. 
This led to the radar being able to detect not only any motion inside the container, but 
also the motion of the container walls. Detecting the motion of all the walls allows 
intrusions from any direction, not just the container doors, to be detected, something that 
all other cargo sensors lacked. However, an unwanted side effect is that it also detects the 
vibration of the walls, an event that happens quite often when the container is being 
moved or it is dropped. Being able to detect all motion inside the container also has 
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another unwanted side effect of alarming due to shifting cargo, which also occurs when 
the container is in motion. Since these false alarms are caused by the motion of the 
container and not the movement of an object within, the CSD will need to be able to 
detect container movement and rule out alarms triggered as a result. The detection of 
movement will be addressed by a sensor capable of measuring any vibration, shock, 
and/or motion of the container as discussed later.  
 
 
 
Figure 22: Loaded cargo container used for test LLNL radar operation. 
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Figure 23: Illustration of multipath. 
 
 Tests for how well the CSD was capable of detecting intrusions were developed 
to support the sponsor’s requirements. The sponsor explicitly stated that the CSD must be 
capable of a 95% detection rate per door event and a 4% error rate. A door event is 
defined as any unauthorized opening of the door while the container is supposed to be 
sealed. A door event may or may not include an intruder’s entrance into the container. 
The sponsor defines the error rate as the percentage of false negatives and false positives 
caused by the system failing and the percentage of false positives due to container motion 
causing the CSD to alarm.  
6.2.1. Test Development 
 To test the detection rate for door opening events, two cases were used: one case 
where the door was opened and closed, and another where the door was opened, an 
intruder entered the container, and then exited and closed the door. For the first case, the 
door was opened no less than six inches for at least two seconds before it was closed. The 
opening width and duration for the first test case reflects the average width and time 
needed to quickly place a small object inside the container. For the second case the 
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intruder moved about the container for at least five seconds, never going farther than half 
the container length. Again, these test parameters represent the average case of an 
intrusion as found by the sponsor and LLNL. To test the CSD’s ability to detect break-ins 
from any wall, the sensor was placed in seven different locations within the container 
with 50 intrusion events occurring while the sensor was at each location. The CSD was 
firmly attached to the walls so that the sensors motion would match the containers. In 
addition, each case was administered with the container empty and with the container 
approximately half full. An empty container allowed the CSD to have line-of-sight with 
all of cargo area, while the partially loaded container tested the sensor’s ability to detect 
intrusions with obstacles blocking its direct view. A successful detection of an intrusion 
is defined as the CSD logging at least one alarm entry per intrusion. Since each test case 
occurs for a duration of time, the sensor may detect multiple instances of motion per 
intrusion.  
 Testing the detection error rate due to container motion is a more difficult task. 
While a container is being shipped, it will be loaded and travel on ships, trains and trucks, 
causing the container to rock and tilt. In addition, the containers are often dropped or 
struck by an object. There are two main types of motion that the container can 
experience: lower frequency movements (surge, sway, and yaw) and high frequency 
movements (shock and vibration). To replicate container motion during shipping, ideally 
the container would be sealed and then lifted by a crane and moved around. However, 
this is an extensive test setting which would be hard to repeat. Since the CSD’s motion is 
coupled to the container’s (due to it being tightly attached to the walls), the ability of the 
sensor to rule out alarms due to container movement can be tested by moving the sensor 
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and checking if it still logs alarms. To test if the CSD could rule out alarms during 
periods of lower frequency motion, the sensor was attached to a rotating arm that was 
manually operated. The arm would be rotated at different speeds with the CSD attached 
in different orientations. Since the motion of a container on a ship, train, or truck varies 
greatly, the sensitivity of the motion detection can be tuned. For the test case, the 
threshold was set to .5 g, the minimum value stated by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation for cargo to withstand during transportation [11]. If an alarm was logged 
while the accelerometer reported a reading of .5 g or above, then the alarm was 
considered an error. Creating a test case for vibration and shock sensitivity was simpler; 
the CSD was mounted to the wall and the container was struck so that the walls would 
vibrate. During the test, there were no intrusions into the container; therefore an alarm 
logged at anytime during the test was considered an error. Furthermore, if an 
accelerometer event was not logged when the vibration occurred, it was considered an 
error.  
6.2.2. Door Event Tests 
 The test results for the door opening test cases, as seen in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
show that the CSD accomplishes the sponsor’s requirements for the detection rate per 
door event with the overall detection rate being 98.7%. Furthermore, the test cases reveal 
that certain mounting locations inside the container are more ideal for the reliable 
detection of intrusions; the sensor being mounted on the container’s roof near the door 
produced the lowest error rates. Conversely, the detection rate was lowest when the 
sensor was mounted on the right wall near the rear of the container. When comparing the 
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test results for an empty container to the partially loaded container it can be seen that 
cargo has a slight adverse effect on the detection rate, lowering it from 99.5% to 98%. 
 Table 1 reports the results for the door opening event tests in an open container 
with no intruder entry. The overall detection rate for this test case was 98.9%, with false 
negatives occurring when the sensor was placed on the roof or the right or left wall near 
the back of the container. Since the sensor was able to detect all intrusions when located 
on any wall near the front as well as when it was on the back wall facing the front, it 
appears that a combination of the sensors orientation (not facing toward the door) and its 
location (near the back of the container) caused the detection rate to drop.  
 
Table 1: Results for door opening with empty container test case. 
Sensor Location 
True 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
False 
Positive Total 
Left Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Left Wall Near 
Rear 49 1 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Rear 48 2 0 50 
Rear Wall  50 0 0 50 
Roof Near Door 50 0 0 50 
Roof Near Rear 49 1 0 50 
Totals 346 4 0 350 
Detection Rate 98.9 
    
 Table 2 contains the detection data for the test case of a door event as well as 
intruder entry into an empty container. The CSD was able to detect every intrusion that 
was administered. When comparing Table 1 to Table 2, it can be seen that the sensor is 
more sensitive to intruder motion within the container than it is to the motion of the door. 
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If the CSD did not detect the opening or closing of the door, it was able to detect the 
presence of the intruder. One reason for the higher detection rate is most likely attributed 
to the PIR sensor’s effectiveness at detecting motion when it has an unobstructed line-of-
sight with the intruder. Although this was not a test case directly required by the sponsor, 
who was more concerned with strictly door event and no entry, the results are important 
since intrusions typically involve the introduction of new objects (whether it be the 
intruders or unwanted cargo) or the removal of existing cargo. The motion of such 
objects inside the container increases the detection ability of the CSD.  
 
Table 2: Results for door opening and entry with empty container test case. 
Sensor Location 
True 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
False 
Positive Total 
Left Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Left Wall Near 
Rear 50 0 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Rear 50 0 0 50 
Rear Wall  50 0 0 50 
Roof Near Door 50 0 0 50 
Roof Near Rear 50 0 0 50 
Totals 350 0 0 350 
Detection Rate 100 
    
 The same test summarized in Table 1 was repeated but with the container partially 
loaded with cargo. It is important to note that with the container loaded, the sensors line-
of-sight with the door was blocked when it was placed on the left wall near the rear, on 
the right wall near the rear, and on the rear wall. Table 3 shows the results of the test and 
mostly coincides with the results seen in Table 1. These results, however, depict the 
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effects of the cargo on the detection rate. When the sensors line-of-sight with the 
intrusion was blocked, the detection rate dropped. This is specifically seen with the 
increase in false negatives when the sensor was placed near the rear of the container. 
 
Table 3: Results for door opening with loaded container test case. 
Sensor Location 
True 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
False 
Positive Total 
Left Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Left Wall Near 
Rear 48 2 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Rear 47 3 0 50 
Rear Wall  45 5 0 50 
Roof Near Door 50 0 0 50 
Roof Near Rear 50 0 0 50 
Totals 340 10 0 350 
Detection Rate 97.1 
    
 
 Table 4 is the results of the test case where an intruder entered a partially loaded 
container and then exited. The same trend can be seen when comparing Tables 4 and 3 as 
when comparing Tables 2 and 1: intruder entry increases the detection rate of the CSD. 
However, when comparing Tables 4 and 2, the effects of the partially loaded container 
are seen through the lower detection rate reported in Table 4. When the container was 
empty the CSD could rely on the PIR sensor to detect motion, but with a loaded container 
and an obstructed view, the radar became the primary sensor. As with the other test 
results, with the exclusion of the sensor located on the rear wall in Table 3, the CSD had 
the lowest detection rate when located on the right wall near the rear. The poor behavior 
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of the sensor located on the rear wall in Table 3 is likely due to the large amount of cargo 
that was present between the sensor and the intrusion. The right wall near the end of the 
container appears to be the least ideal location for the CSD.   
 
Table 4: Results for door opening and entry with loaded container test case. 
Sensor Location 
True 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
False 
Positive Total 
Left Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Left Wall Near 
Rear 49 1 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Door 50 0 0 50 
Right Wall Near 
Rear 48 2 0 50 
Rear Wall  49 1 0 50 
Roof Near Door 50 0 0 50 
Roof Near Rear 50 0 0 50 
Totals 346 4 0 350 
Percent Error 98.9 
   
 
6.2.3. Container Motion Tests 
  The results for the movement tests, listed in Table 5, find that the CSD logged an 
alarm due to its motion for 3% of the test samples. Most of the errors (five out of six) 
occurred when the sensor was either mounted facing up or down. A possible explanation 
for this behavior is that the accelerometer filters the acceleration measured on its Z-axis, 
assuming that the sensor will be oriented so that this is the axis aligned with Earth’s 
gravity. The accelerometer was mounted on the motherboard in that manner. When the 
sensor is oriented in either of those two positions, the movement administered during the 
test will be measured on the sensor’s Z-axis, which will be filtered. The filtering may 
have reduced the amount of motion perceived by the accelerometer, bringing it under the 
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set threshold that triggers a motion event and therefore causing the CSD to not report 
container motion. 
   
Table 5: Results for movement test case.  
Sensor Orientation 
True 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
False 
Positive Total 
Facing Up 47 0 3 50 
Facing Down 48 0 2 50 
On Left Side 50 0 0 50 
On Right Side 49 0 1 50 
Totals 194 0 6 200 
Error Rate 3.00 
    
 
 Table 6 reports the results for the vibration tests, showing that the CSD alarmed 
due to container vibration 3.4% of the time. The CSD had the most errors when located 
on walls that are near the stronger structural components of the container. A possible 
explanation is that the locations farther away from the container’s structure (mainly the 
roof) have a stronger response to container vibration and movement. These locations 
experience greater, or longer, accelerations that the CSD is more capable of detecting. 
Combining the results from Tables 5 and 6 confirm that the CSD’s detection error rate 
due to container movement is under the 4% sponsor requirement, with the sensor falsely 
alarming 3.3% of the time. 
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Table 6: Results for vibration test case. 
Sensor Location 
True 
Positives 
False 
Negative 
False 
Positive Total 
Left Wall Near 
Door 46 0 4 50 
Left Wall Near 
Rear 47 0 3 50 
Right Wall Near 
Door 48 0 2 50 
Right Wall Near 
Rear 49 0 1 50 
Rear Wall  48 0 2 50 
Roof Near Door 50 0 0 50 
Roof Near Rear 50 0 0 50 
Totals 338 0 12 350 
Error Rate 3.43 
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Conclusion 
 This study has found that the LLNL micropower ultra-wideband appears to be a 
suitable solution for the detection of intrusions in cargo shipping containers. Specifically, 
through the testing of the standalone radar as well as the CSD using the radar, this study 
has shown that the technology is highly reliable for the detection of container intrusions. 
The radar’s penetrating ability, low susceptibility to noise and behavior due to multipath 
are features that make it an effective break-in sensor inside a container. A CSD 
employing the radar technology along with supporting sensors and hardware (PIR, 
accelerometer, processor, etc.) is capable of detecting container break-ins with low error 
rates. By selecting low-power options for the support hardware and the low-power 
operation of the impulse radar, the CSD can be powered by common, easily accessible 
batteries (such as AAs) and not require replacements for up to six months. The project 
also investigated the new Bluetooth Low Energy standard and used it in a unique way. It 
was found that BLE devices provide ultra low-power solutions for wireless 
communication, and, although not originally designed for bulk data transfer, can be used 
for the transmission of relatively large amounts of data in short periods of time 
(approximately 200 kbps). Through the use of the latest Bluetooth Low Energy devices, 
cargo container inspections will no longer require the opening and examination of the 
container. Instead, a reading device can wirelessly connect to the CSD inside the 
container and download the tamper status, allowing inspectors to know whether further 
investigation is needed. The end result is a reliable and inexpensive CSD which requires 
minimal effort, has a low impact on the loading, unloading, and sealing of the container, 
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and enables the rapid approval of shipping containers during inspection. The design 
proposed in this study can be used when developing future CSDs.  
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